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“BOILERPLATE”: AN INTRODUCTION
Omri Ben-Shahar *

Abstract

This short essay introduces the themes that are developed in twelve
articles that were delivered recently in a symposium on “Boilerplate:
Foundations of Market Contracts” at the University of Michigan
Law School. The proceeding of the symposium will be published in
Volume 104 of the Michigan Law Review.
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Ben-Shahar:

It is tempting to open this symposium with yet another “boilerplate” salute to
the challenge that standard form contracts pose for contract law doctrine. You
may have seen plenty such tributes to this fundamental problem. If I were to
offer my own variation on this familiar introduction, I would have perhaps tried
to come up with an original spin, to induce you to read forward another
paragraph or two. I would probably have talked about a major divide within
contract law, between the “law of negotiations” and “product regulation.” The
former is the body of doctrines that determine the legal consequences of
bargaining behavior; the later is the assortment of substantive limitations on
terms of bargains, some general to all contracts, other industry- or area-specific.
I would then have argued that the study of standard form belongs to the latter,
not the former, and that this distinction can help overcome many difficulties in
contract law doctrine.
Such would surely be an appropriate overture for a conference on boilerplate.
Boilerplate, recall, are the building blocks of standard form, non-negotiated,
contracts. The enforceability of boilerplate is very much the legal locus where
the philosophical debate over the regulation of markets hits the road. Boilerplate
employment arbitration terms, for example, are the core of one of the most
intriguing and fundamental debates in current contract law, over the scope of the
unconscionability doctrine. 1
And yet, with “boilerplate” being the theme of this conference, there is a
looming paradoxical feature with such an introduction: it would be, in and of
itself, a boilerplate introduction! It would satisfy all the attributes that
introductions-to-symposia are known to have. It would begin with a general
reminder of the importance (and timeliness!) of the topic. It would demonstrate
that the “stakes” are more than just conceptual-scholarly clarity, but rather that
the business world anxiously awaits the academia’s “last word” on the topic—
here, the academic gospel concerning the efficacy of market contracts. The
standard introduction would then maintain that the issues are not yet resolved,
cite leading scholars who have acknowledged how difficult the issues are, and
posit that this lack of resolution is manifested in inadequate development of the
doctrine. And finally, this hypothetical introduction would lay out a set of
questions that ought to be addressed, and the various ways in which the
contributions to the symposium advance the answers to these questions.

________________________________________________________
1

Compare the California Supreme Court’s holding in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare
Services, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 785 (2000) with the Seventh Circuit view in Oblix v.
Winiecki, 374 F.3d 488 (7th Cir., 2004).
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You likely have read, by now, many such introductions to symposia, and can
recognize their boilerplate structure, their adherence to the how-to-write-anintroduction protocol. But if this hypothetical introduction—the one I eventually
decided not to write—is indeed standard and predictable, it doesn’t only
introduce the topic of “boilerplate;” it is also embodies that very phenomenon.
Thus, ironically, it must satisfy many of the characteristics of boilerplate that
the articles in this symposium will describe. Writing an introduction about
boilerplate, it turns out, is also producing a boilerplate!
Perhaps the most obvious analogy between boilerplate contract and boilerplate
introductions is the following. Like boilerplate contracts, boilerplate
introductions-to-symposia are not read by anybody. (Why, then, are they
written, you may naïvely wonder. I’ll say something about this below.) The
“unreadness” property is of course a troubling phenomenon, both for contracts
and for symposia-introductions. Luckily, some of the contributions to this
symposium address this unreadness feature of boilerplate. Robert Hillman, for
example, investigates whether internet disclosure mechanisms can help
consumer know what’s in the contract, or would they merely backfire against
the interest of consumers; 2 Michelle Boardman suggests that in some industries
the unreadness (and unreadability) of boilerplate is a perfectly reasonable—in
fact, desirable—feature of a system in which contract terms are written not to
expropriate value, but to stabilize meanings. 3
Here is a second analogy between boilerplate terms and symposia introductions:
they appear “objective,” but they are often one-sided. You can probably recall
some introductions you read to past symposia (despite their unreadness…), in
which the introducer puts on a mask of neutrality, acknowledged all the relevant
and conflicting perspectives, provided broad-as-possible context and normative
appeal, and yet planted in all of that objectivity his or her own controversial
agenda, building upon a set of selective assumptions and skewed observations. I
am sure I can recall some such introductions, and I’m pretty sure I even wrote
one. 4 Similar to introductions, this buried one-sidedness is also a very familiar
feature of boilerplate contracts. Disguised by “legalese,” they are often
unbalanced, favoring their drafter. But while the one-sidedness of consumer
contracts is hardly a discovery, several contributions to the symposium offer a
new understanding of this phenomenon. Lucian Bebchuk and Richard Posner in
________________________________________________________
2

Robert Hillman, On-Line Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms
Backfire?
3
Michelle Boardman, Contra Proferentem—the Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate.
4
Omri Ben-Shahar, Forward – Freedom From Contract, in Symposium on Freedom from Contract, 2004
Wisc. L. Rev. 261.
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one paper, 5 and Jason Johnston in another paper, 6 argue that self-serving
boilerplate terms may not be as bad as they seem. They argue that one-sided
terms are a general feature of contracts written by firms who care about their
reputations and who do not intend to strictly enforce such terms. These two
papers argue that firms write one-sided terms in order to have the option to
enforce them selectively, to fend-off consumer opportunism, but otherwise let
their honest clients off. Johnston nicely calls it “tailored forgiveness”;
Bebchuk/Posner attribute this feature to the observability but non-verifiability of
opportunism—that is, to the difficulty of proving it in court. Both these papers
portray a reality in which one-sidedness poses less of a concern than previously
recognized. In contrast, Ronald Mann examines one-sided boilerplate in credit
card contracts and concludes that they continue to burden debtors. 7 He suggests
that contract law doctrine may be inadequate in dealing with this problem, and
explores the case for prohibitions against some such terms, or even a regulatory
promulgation of more balanced mandatory clauses.
There is another, more subtle feature of introductions-to-symposia, which they
again share with boilerplate terms. In a typical introduction, the collection of
papers in the symposium being introduced is not a result of a tournament or
competition between able scholars. The list is solicited, tailored, and the writer
of the introduction is usually the person who put together this list, shaped it to
correspond with what he or she perceives to be the ideal agenda. In the same
way that the introduction describes a substance that is not negotiated but rather
unilaterally tailored, the boilerplate contract stipulates a substance of a
transaction that is not negotiated or bilaterally dickered, but rather dictated,
unilaterally drafted. Of course, this raises difficult questions about the
relationship between boilerplate and the power to dictate. Douglas Baird
demonstrates in this conference some of the fallacies that have become all-toocommon in addressing this relationship. 8 He argues that the evils of
concentrated economic power have nothing to do boilerplate. Revisiting some
of the classic cases from the folklore of contract law, he shows that it is not the
fine print that makes some clauses troublesome. But in a rich and original paper,
David Gilo and Ariel Porat show a variety of previously unrecognized ways in
which boilerplate terms do operate in an anti-competitive fashion, such as to
price discriminate, facilitate collusion among sellers, and deter entry by new
________________________________________________________
5

Lucian Bebchuk and Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets.
6
Jason S. Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of Standard Form Contracts and the
Negotiation of Business Relationships
7
Ronald Mann, “Contracting” for Credit
8
Douglas Baird, The Boilerplate Paradox
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sellers. 9 The unilateral drafting of boilerplate is also studied by Ben-Shahar and
White in a merchant-to-merchant context. They study the contract between
automotive companies and their suppliers, one of the most important (in terms
of economic stakes) form contracts ever drafted. 10 They uncover several ways
in which the drafters of these contracts prevent negotiations and tailoring from
ever occurring, to bolster their economic rents.
If there is a significant boilerplate element to the craft of writing an
introduction—if introductions are indeed standard and predictable—it begs the
question: why bother writing them? Similarly, if a form contract is boilerplate,
to be used and replicated by many similarly situated parties, why would any
single individual have the incentive to draft it? A boilerplate contract is a public
good—an “item” that is copied freely by others—and we should therefore
expect a problem of underproduction. This question is studied directly by Kevin
Davis, who identifies the production paradox and looks at the role of nonprofit
organizations in generating boilerplate contracts. 11 It is also studied by Stephen
Choi and Mitu Gulati, who look at the incentives of boilerplate drafters, and
define their crucial role in giving interpretive meaning to boilerplate. 12 Choi and
Gulati’s study is even more ambitious: it suggests that a better way to
understand the emergence of boilerplate—and to interpret it when ambiguous—
is to perceive of it as statute and apply statutory interpretation techniques to
dispute resolutions.
I have noticed another thing about published symposia: readers rarely sit down
to read an entire symposium, from the introduction to the last article. Rather,
most readers may bump into one or a small subset of individual symposium
papers that are of particular interest to them. This suggests that, other than for
the participants in the conference, there is really no audience for introductions.
Summarizing to the hypothetical symposium reader what the articles of the
symposium are about is a service that future readers don’t really need, and of
which very few would make use. In other words, symposia introductions are a
wasteful—inefficient?—scholarly effort. This conclusion is every bit as
unorthodox as the idea that boilerplate contracts may also be inefficient. And
yet the claim that boilerplate could be inefficient is a more difficult proposition
to defend. There is a long tradition in law and economics arguing for the
efficiency of standard form contracts. Several of the contributions in this
________________________________________________________
9

David Gilo and Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate in Standard Form Contracts
10
Omri Ben-Shahar and James J. White, Boilerplate and Economics Power in Auto Manufacturing
Contracts
11
Kevin Davis, The Role of Non-Profits in the Production of Boilerplate
12
Stephen Choi and Mitu G. Gulati, Contract as Statute
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symposium, however, suggest otherwise, and provide either evidence or new
theoretical underpinnings for the inefficiency conjecture. 13 Stephen Choi and
Mitu Gulati, studying the evolution of boilerplate in sophisticated transactions,
show why it is often unlikely that boilerplate converge to the most efficient
terms. 14
If I somehow got you to read thus far, you may recognize that this introduction
includes two types of “information.” The first type is specific to the forthcoming
symposium and conveys its particular context (e.g., my references to the
specific papers and to the prior standard form contracts literature). The second
type of stuff you read is more general and can be used, with almost no changes,
to introduce other symposia, on a variety of topics. This distinction roughly
corresponds to what Henry Smith, in his important contribution to this
conference, calls intensive and extensive communications. 15 Contracts, when
drafted ad-hoc, are highly intensive information-rich rights. Property, in
contrast, is less context-dependent, less information-specific, and therefore more
extensive. Smith suggests that boilerplate represents a shift of contractual rights
towards the status of property. He argues that the modularity feature of
boilerplate is what allows it to have its extensive appeal.
Finally, in many contracts that are otherwise skewed in favor of their drafter, we
nevertheless find boilerplate terms that appear to accord some balance. For
example, one of the “hidden roles” of boilerplate that Gilo and Porat discover in
their paper is the provision of true and accessible benefits—but only to those
who labor to read the unreadable contract. 16 Likewise, two contributions to this
conference are aimed at providing more balance—and more fairness?—to the
otherwise dominant law-and-economics presence, but, like boilerplate, can be
accessible mainly to readers who will labor to read through most of the other
articles. I have asked two of the more influential scholars that have studied
standard form contracts using other approaches to comment on the ideas that are
advanced in the symposium. Accordingly, Margaret Jane Radin, whose recent
work identifies new challenges posed by standardization of contract in the
digital age, 17 and Todd Rakoff, whose seminal work on contracts of adhesion
________________________________________________________
13

Gilo and Porat, supra note 9, show various ways in which boilerplate reduce competition and thus
reduce total welfare; Ben-Shahar and White, supra note 10, suggest that standard form purchase orders
in the automotive business exhibit various inefficient terms.
14
Choi & Gulati, supra note 12.
15
Henry Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow.
16
Gilo and Porat, supra note 9, p. 19.
17
Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine, 70 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1125 (2002); Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L. J. 1125 (2000);
Regime Change in Intellectual Property Law: Superseding the Law of the State with the “Law” of the
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continues to provide a baseline for the study of form contracts, 18 responded to
this challenge. 19 Note that these “comments” are anything but the boilerplate
comments that sometimes are affixed to symposium articles. Rather, this
symposium provides a platform for Radin and for Rakoff to examine the
emerging inventory of new ideas about boilerplate—an inventory that is
hopefully richer after this symposium—and to reevaluate their own thinking on
the topic.
*****
As occasional market transactors, you surely know that many important details
of transactions you are about to enter are buried in boilerplate, but you often
prefer to read sellers’ pamphlets to figure out the “big picture,” what the bargain
is about. What, then, is the big picture coming out of this symposium? What can
we write on our pamphlet? I think we can safely say this symposium is breaking
new ground in the study of boilerplate and standard forms, beyond the general
claims about market power and network externalities. On a theoretical level,
boilerplate is shown to be a legal phenomenon different than contract. Is it a
statute? Is it property? Is it a product? On an empirical level, boilerplate is
studied in specific contexts, including insurance, credit cards, auto
manufacturing, debt financing, and electronic commerce. The contributions to
the symposium reveal subtle and previously unrecognized ways in which
boilerplate clauses encourage information flow—but also dampen it; increase
competition—but also reduce it; how new boilerplate terms are produced—and
how innovation in boilerplate is stifled; how negotiation happens in the shadow
of boilerplate—and how it is subdued; and offer new explanations as to why
boilerplate is so often one-sided. With emphasis on empiricism and economic
thinking, this symposium provides a more nuanced understanding of the “DNA”
of market contracts—the boilerplate terms.

Firm, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 173 (2003-2004).
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction , 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983)
19
[Cite Radin’s and Rakoff’s comments here].
18
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